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To be honest, I can understand to a certain extent why some politicians in the
German governing coalition have begun to react somewhat peevishly to the word
“unconstitutional”. For months now, they have been getting slapped in the face
with the Grundgesetz for nearly everything they do or don’t in discharge of their
office or mandate, mostly by people whose passion and self-confidence in dealing
with fundamental rights concepts is in inverse proportion to their constitutional
legal judgment. That kind of thing gets to you after a while, I suppose. And then,
inevitably, along comes Hans-Jürgen Papier, the former President of the Federal
Constitutional Court and now universally deployable federal unconstitutional-
declarer, to do once more what is expected of him, this time in an interview with the
Berliner Morgenpost.
Jurisprudentially informed opinions of law professors often get misinterpreted as an
authoritative source of knowledge of exactly what action or inaction is required by
(constitutional) law, not exclusively, but definitely in Germany. This week, this could
be seen once again in the daily paper DIE WELT ($), which accused the governing
coalition of still not having remedied all constitutional concerns of experts in the
hearing of the health committee of the Bundestag. There are, of course, many valid
constitutional reasons to criticize the legislature’s (in-)actions in the pandemic, and
that is exactly what the said experts have been busy doing. But the sheer fact that
the legislature sometimes decides against their advice is not one of them. The Basic
Law, like any law, is a text open to interpretation, and the Bundestag may or even
must take the same risks in interpreting it as any other constitutional interpreter. The
experts it consults can make sure it doesn’t miss any important argument. But they
cannot relieve it of the responsibility for what it finds right.
Heribert Hirte, the acting chairman of the Bundestag’s Legal Affairs Committee, was
so annoyed by the WELT article that he immediately posted a tweet in which he
remarkably took aim not so much at WELT as at two critical scholars from the expert
hearing, both authors of Verfassungsblog, quoted by WELT. Thorsten Kingreen and
Andrea Kießling, writes the CDU politician (originally a civil law professor himself),
“serve, across the board, always as quotation givers” (“dienen durch die Bank immer
als Zitatgeber“) to the Covid-denying lunatic-fringe scene known as “Querdenker” in
Germany.
STEFAN RIXEN, also in his capacity as spokesman for the DFG “Ombudsman for
Science” committee, has already said what needs to be said from the perspective
of legal science. In addition, Hirte’s phrase seems remarkable to me because it
absolutizes legal scholarship with a reversed sign, so to speak: Instead of stamping
law professors as donors of authoritative knowledge, they get stamped as “quotation
givers” of crazy right-wing people whom they “serve”, and “across the board,
always”. The effect is the same: What disappears from view is the fact that their input
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is an opinion which in principle can be contested by anyone who has the arguments
to do it.
One could confidently dismiss the whole matter as an unpleasant, but altogether
rather unimportant event in a highly nervous and tense situation of perpetuated
crisis, were it not for the fact that it resonates with a previous affair which occurred
during the last major crisis of this sort. In the refugee crisis of 2015-2018, as is
well known, the Federal Minister of the Interior (in office to this day), seconded
by a whole squad of high-profile constitutional law scholars, had proclaimed the
“rule of lawlessness” (Herrschaft des Unrechts) that had allegedly broken out as a
result of the alleged “opening of the borders” for refugees. Fortunately, there were
enough EU law scholars in possession of arguments sound enough to contest this
opinion, and today the thesis of the “rule of lawlessness” can be considered by-and-
large discredited (I wrote a whole book on this together with Stephan Detjen). But
remember: it was only less than three years ago that the entire republic almost took
a turn toward authoritarian populism just because of that thing, which was brought
about with the active help of many a well-renowned law professor. I suppose many
of us are still frightened to our bones, and rightly so.
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There are, however, a few glaring and evident differences between the constitutional
law scholars’ diagnoses then and now. First, the constellation in terms of
fundamental rights was quite different: Back then, fundamental rights and their
bearers hardly played any role in the constitutional criticism, or if they did, then ex
negativo in terms of cutting back the scope of protection. The alleged constitutional
norms against which the “opening of the borders” was measured came instead
mostly from the lofty heights of state theory. Today, by contrast, it is the shrunken
space of individual freedom that underpins the demand for a stronger legal basis for
the Covid-19 measures.
Above all, however, the situation today differs from the situation then in that this time
there is no actual lawlessness which is to be made invisible by the clamour about
a supposed “rule of lawlessness” elsewhere. As is well known, the crisis of 2015
had begun with the member states at the EU’s external border, first and foremost
Hungary, abandoning their obligations under EU asylum law. What rules to this
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very day at the external borders, I suppose, can be labelled as lawlessness quite
correctly. To bring about exactly these conditions at the German-Austrian internal EU
border was exactly what the protagonists of the “rule of lawlessness” discourse back
then were up to.
I don’t see any equivalent to this in the current discussion. The toxic mixture of
state-theory mumbo-jumbo and ethnic-cultural purity and exclusion fantasies that
characterized the debate back then is – alhamdulillah! – back in the bottle.  The
vast majority of constitutional law scholars who criticize Covid-19 measures these
days, on the other hand, are simply doing their jobs. Whether I agree with all their
diagnoses is secondary; the main thing is that, if I don’t, I can contest them if I have
the arguments to do so. This is what I would recommend to Heribert Hirte and all
others who have started to take against those insufferable know-it-all constitutional
lawyers.
This week on Verfassungsblog
Several German Länder plan to forcibly detain persistent quarantine breakers.
CHRISTOPH GUSY wonders: is this still infection control law or already police law?
Since the beginning of the week, it has been mandatory in Bavaria to wear an FFP2
mask on public transport and in shops. Nationwide, simple cloth masks will soon no
longer suffice either. For those on welfare that is a substantial burden. But can they
demand that the costs be covered? MARJE MÜLDER thinks they likely can.
Donald Trump is no longer President of the United States, but he will stand trial in
Congress to be removed from office in retrospect. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE explains
why impeachment, while risky for Democrats, makes sense, and in the end, private
law consequences could be the means to hold Trump liable for the consequences of
his actions.
In investigating the crimes surrounding the storming of the U.S. Capitol, American
authorities are using controversial facial recognition technologies. CHRISTIAN
RÜCKERT explains why their use is illegal under German law and what would have
to be taken into account when introducing an according legal basis.
Joe Biden is the President of the United States, and MICHAELA HAILBRONNER
and JAMES FOWKES, on the occasion of the inauguration, muse about just how
lucky the USA has been after all, so far.
On December 11, 2020, the Austrian Constitutional Court overturned the ban
on assisted suicide as unconstitutional. Only a few months earlier, the Federal
Constitutional Court had declared the ban on the promotion of suicide void. The
decisions represent significant liberalization steps for both states. Now it’s up to
lawmakers to come up with solutions, find ALEXANDER BRADE and ROMAN
FRIEDRICH.
Five years ago, in January 2016, the EU Commission first activated the Rule of
Law Framework for Poland. The Polish government’s ongoing attacks on the rule
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of law since then threaten the entire European legal order. In Part II of their series,
LAURENT PECH, PATRYK WACHOWIEC and DARIUSZ MAZUR review the key
rulings from 2020 and reiterate their call for the EU institutions to act.
The German Bundestag and Bundesrat have passed an amendment to the anti-trust
law, which is intended to give the Federal Anti-Trust Office more scope for action vis-
à-vis ‘big tech‘. It remains to be seen whether the adjustments are actually suitable
for effectively addressing the market power of the large platform companies and their
behavior in competition. At the very least, JÜRGEN KÜHLING finds, the amendment
can inform the Digital Markets Act at the EU level.
On Dec. 15, Spain’s Constitutional Court rejected the appeal of a union member
convicted of desecrating the Spanish flag during a workers’ protest. Now the
reasons for the ruling have been published: With their decision, the judges denied
constitutional protection to statements directed against the flag, even if they occur
in the context of political activism. The ruling shows that freedom of expression is
increasingly under threat in Spain, warns JOAQUÍN URÍAS.
GRIETJE BAARS reports on an English High Court ruling that puberty blockers
should no longer be available to trans youth under 16. The court based its decision
on the fact that puberty blockers can have irreversible effects and that adolescents
under 16 cannot assess those consequences. Better, then, according to the court’s
logic, to let them experience the irreversible effects of puberty – which only makes
later conversion more invasive.
The parliamentary groups in the German Bundestag are fully funded by state
resources, and their use of funds is subject to strict rules. If they violate these,
however, there are no consequences. HEIKE MERTEN explains the report of
the Federal Court of Auditors, which clearly identifies the structural deficits of
parliamentary group financing.
Since Ukraine’s Constitutional Court overturned anti-corruption legislation at the
end of October last year, the country has found itself in a veritable constitutional
crisis. President Zelensky is now playing anti-corruption and the rule of law against
each other. Most recently, he suspended the president of the court from office.
ALINA CHERVIATSOVA explains why this move was unconstitutional.
Tesla is currently building a “gigafactory” in the Brandenburg hamlet of Grünheide
near Berlin. Since the plans became known at the end of 2019, citizens and
environmental groups have been regularly complaining and protesting against
the project. In terms of procedural law, the politicians do not seem to have to be
reproached here. However, the approval procedure is also not suitable for creating
acceptance among the population for such large-scale projects, says BIRGIT
PETERS.
The EU likes to see itself as a force for good when it comes to human rights, but the
latest agreement with China speaks a different language. SURYA DEVA teaches
in Hong Kong and knows how things have been going there since the enactment of
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the National Security Act, and in his view, the sincerity of the EU’s commitment to
human rights in China very much remains to be seen.
So much for this week.
As always, you can make your contribution to the upkeep of Verfassungsblog here
(permanently) and here (one-off), which I kindly ask you to do.
Thank you for that and for your attention, and see you next week!
Max Steinbeis
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